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FLORIDA’S GROWTH MANAGEMENT ODYSSEY: REVOLUTION, 
EVOLUTION, DEVOLUTION…..RESOLUTION 
Robert M. Rhodes* 
I have enjoyed reading Homer’s epic poem The Odyssey. It is an allegory 
of struggle and perseverance that offers enduring insights and encouragement for 
anyone engaged in adventures and intellectual quests. I expect my friend Dr. 
Juergensmeyer has often identified with Odysseus’ challenges over his 55 years 
of distinguished teaching and administration. I know I have. 
An odyssey is a long, often difficult voyage or quest with many changes in 
fortune. It is an apt description of Florida’s almost half century effort to manage 
its growth by enacting various state initiated legislation and related directives.  
My goal is to relate the Florida story with special emphasis on what I 
consider its distinctive feature and the key institutional driver of its growth 
management program, the state’s role.1    Why focus on the state’s role? 
Balanced state policy and oversight are central to Florida’s 
intergovernmental planning program. Policy establishes state goals that should be 
reflected in local planning and development decisions. Oversight provides the 
teeth, some call it the hammer or watch dog, for implementing and enforcing the 
state program. When properly articulated and applied, policy driven oversight can 
provide local government’s policy context, sound process, tools and sometimes 
political cover and support to make difficult decisions. A state framework can 
also infuse a measure of uniformity into Florida’s myriad of local land use 
planning programs.2   It can provide a degree of desirable certainty that benefits 
all participants in planning decisions and enhances Florida’s economic 
development prospects.3  
Note I said a state program can accomplish these aims. Over the years, 
attainment has been irregular, primarily due to the philosophy and politics of the 
state leadership at the time   and consequent budget and statutory policy.     
To better understand Florida’s odyssey, here is a snapshot history of our 
state and local planning program.4   
 
* Former administrator of Florida’s growth management program and Chairman, State of Florida 
Second Environmental and Land Management Study Committee. Practitioner in Residence, 
Georgia State School of Law, 2010. Former senior executive with The Walt Disney Development 
Company and The St. Joe Company. Graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, and 
Harvard Kennedy School. 
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Florida has an enduring home rule tradition.5 True to this legacy, since the 
late 1960s Florida cities and counties enjoyed broad discretion to adopt local land 
use plans and regulations, and if they did, determine their character and legal 
status. But in the early ‘70s, facing a firestorm of environmental, infrastructure 
and other public service crises and a crushing number of new residents to the 
state, the Florida Legislature joined what Fred Bosselman and David Callies 
called “The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Controls.” 6   By joining the revolution, 
the state broke with tradition and recouped some of the power and discretion 
previously delegated to localities to plan and regulate land use. 
The early ‘70s  legislative products included  the development of regional 
impact program, which  required intergovernmental review of large-scale 
development and infrastructure projects that would impact the citizens of more 
than one county.7   An  area of critical state concern  program  granted the state 
authority  to impose state planning goals and local regulations on especially 
sensitive and threatened environmental resource areas.8    Later,  a state appointed 
work group, the First Environmental Land Management Study Committee, known 
as ELMS I,  took the lead in developing and the Legislature enacted the state’s 
first mandatory local planning program, the 1975 Local Government 
Comprehensive Planning Act.9  
The local planning act was an important milestone that poured a 
foundation for later legislation, but was not a startling success. Working with a 
broadly worded state mandate to produce local comprehensive plans with minimal 
state guidance, little technical and financial assistance, and no penalties for non-
compliance, many local governments adopted loosely worded, internally 
inconsistent advisory plans. Future land use maps were optional and often too 
politically sensitive to produce. Although state policy required consistency 
between plans and development approvals, this policy was largely ignored. 
As a result, the first planning act produced more local plans, but no 
meaningful statewide improvement in planning and growth management practice. 
EVOLUTION 
Concern in the early ‘80s about the ineffectiveness of the local planning 
act prompted appointment of the Second Environmental Land Management Study 
Committee to assess the state’s growth management effort. 
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ELMS II concluded if Florida wants effective growth management, the 
state must take the lead, chart a policy course, and then effectively administer its 
programs. In short: the state must actively engage.10 
The Governor and Legislature agreed with the bulk of ELMS II 
recommendations and legislation was enacted over a two year period that directed  
production of a state comprehensive policy plan  and statutory guidelines for 
regional councils to develop regional policy plans.11  These  plans would pour the 
foundation in 1985 for the state’s Local Government Comprehensive Planning 
and Development Regulation Act, known as  the growth management act or 
GMA.12   Among other action, the GMA called for the state to adopt minimum 
uniform standards for local plans and amendments which would be enforced 
through state  compliance decisions; possible state sanctions for non-complying 
localities;   an adequate public facilities policy that required certain services and 
facilities be available to serve new growth concurrent with the impacts of this 
growth, popularly called concurrency;  a frequency limit for amendments to local 
plans;  a requirement that plans be consistent with the state comprehensive plan 
and regional policy plans and implemented by local land development 
regulations;  expansive public notice provisions for adoption of plans and 
amendments;  and rights  for citizens to challenge administratively  state 
compliance decisions.  The GMA also reaffirmed an earlier requirement that local 
development approvals be consistent with adopted local plans and provided 
certain citizens and groups a judicial remedy to enforce this consistency policy.  
The GMA energized the state program and ultimately produced workable 
and moderately effective growth management. All local governments eventually 
adopted plans that were found in compliance with state standards.  
During the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, first and second generation state 
growth management programs, DRIs and the GMA, were formidable statewide 
proscribers and prescribers for local plans and large projects. But not surprisingly, 
these major state intrusions on traditional local prerogative generated criticism 
and a measure of reproval from both urban and rural localities and some in the 
building industries. The state’s urban sprawl policy, concurrency, which was 
never properly funded by state or local governments, a vague and unpredictable  
policy requiring an assessment of “need” and economic feasibility of new projects 
and the scope and extent of DRI exactions were special lightning rods for GMA 
opposition. This growing criticism, plus the fact the state program was relatively 
new and expected to evolve with experience prompted another major 
reassessment of Florida’s state program by the Third Environmental Land 
Management Study Committee, ELMS III. 
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 Jerry Weitz describes several waves or stages in the development and 
evolution of state growth management programs.13  The fourth wave contemplates  
characteristics especially pertinent to Florida’s more recent  experience:  erosion 
of early mandate driven state planning and regulatory programs, greater flexibility 
for localities to implement state programs and less rigid state application of 
uniform state rules, statutory and rule revisions without benefit of evaluation, and  
the ascendancy of greater intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration.14  
True to the fourth wave, ELMS III concluded that because local 
governments had developed compliance plans and most had enacted 
implementing land development regulations, rigid adherence to uniform state 
standards and program mandates was not desirable or practical.15   The Legislature 
agreed and in the early ‘90s, the state’s oversight role was loosened and certain 
small scale amendments were exempted from state review and ultimately phased 
out and urban areas were granted flexibility to apply state compliance standards  
to local plan amendments.    
State oversight continued to be loosened in the 2000s. In 2007, the 
Legislature established a pilot alternative review project that fast tracked and 
streamlined state review of plan amendments in urban areas.16  The project cut 
review time in half and focused state review on  issues of state and regional 
importance. In 2009, this alternative state review process was authorized 
statewide for plan amendments that would encourage urban redevelopment.17   
Additionally, urban areas were granted flexibility to satisfy transportation 
concurrency and certain dense urban areas, comprising 51% of local governments, 
were exempted from DRI review.18 
Building on  earlier  devolution waves, the  tsunami of  Weitz’s  prescient 
fourth wave hit Florida  shores  with adoption of the 2011 Community Planning 
Act (CPA).19  The act’s  overall  purpose was to strengthen local government’s 
role, processes and powers and to focus the state’s role on protecting important 
state resources and facilities. Passage was fueled by concern the state program 
overreached and was bloated with stultifying processes that unnecessarily delayed 
decisions and produced unacceptable private sector costs. Against the backdrop of 
a severe economic downturn, these concerns attracted the attention of a new state 
administration intent on promoting economic development, producing new jobs, 
cutting back state regulations and a Legislature that shared similar goals. 
Executive branch champions and the bipartisan legislative coalition that had 
enacted and supported an energetic state growth management role was long gone 
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from the capitol. Additionally, the GMA had been amended regularly and 
accumulated irrelevant provisions that were ripe for review and possible revision.     
Separately in 2011, to underscore the new administration’s commitment to 
economic development, the Department of Community Affairs, the state land 
planning agency which administered the GMA, was abolished and the program 
moved into a division of the new Department of Economic Opportunity, the 
DEO.20  
Unlike prior major revisions to the state planning framework, the 2011 act 
was not the product of thorough, deliberate evaluation of program goals and 
results by a broad based group of knowledgeable members and informed by 
extensive public input. Instead, it was largely developed and promoted by a 
relatively small group of state officials and lobbyists with the strong support of a 
new state administration. Its enactment continues to generate controversy and 
strong sentiment. It has been praised as long overdue reform that simplified a 
complex, burdensome intergovernmental program and returns major planning 
responsibility and accountability to local government.21 It has also been excoriated 
as a   wholesale retreat from sound planning practice that cuts the heart out of a 
reasonably  effective program that did not require the major surgery it received.22 
There is some validity to both views, but I do not believe it is productive 
to re-fight the battles over the CPA’s enactment; it is law and will be judged on its 
results. Moreover, and importantly, since its passage there has been no 
discernable interest in the executive and legislative branches to change course. 
The most impactful and contentious part of the act is its effect on the 
state’s oversight role.23   The CPA retained a state oversight role, but it is 
markedly reduced. The 2011 act builds on the 2007 alternative review program 
and applies its expedited process to most proposed plan amendments. Under 
expedited review, DEO and other state and regional agencies may review and 
comment on proposed local plan amendments for any potential adverse impacts to 
important state resources or facilities. Review comments are limited to the subject 
area of each agency’s jurisdiction. DEO may challenge a local action only if it 
determines there will be an adverse impact primarily based on received agency 
comments.24 To date, DEO has not commented on any of these amendments.25  
Another review process, coordinated review, provides more expansive 
state compliance review and applies to larger scale amendments and required 
local plan updates. Like expedited review, coordinated review considers agency 
comments on potential adverse impacts to important state resources and facilities. 
It also may consider various statutory planning policies applicable to proposed 
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local plan amendments.26    DEO may issue objections, recommendations and 
comments and find a proposed amendment not in compliance with state law if an 
amendment may adversely impact an important state resource or facility.     
Since enactment of the 2011 act, DEO has reviewed thousands of 
proposed local amendments; it has found four proposed amendments not in 
compliance with state standards.27    The agency initiated a formal noncompliance 
proceeding in one case and all four cases were resolved through negotiation.28 
DEO’s implementation of the CPA to date reflects a strong desire   to 
largely defer to local government planning decisions and responsibility and to 
amicably resolve and accommodate any differences with local decisions. This 
track record implements a priority of the past administration to minimize state 
regulations and the administrative reality that the state planning program now is 
housed in a department primarily dedicated to promoting its eponymous economic 
opportunity mission. It also evidences a key characteristic of Weitz’s fourth wave, 
enhanced intergovernmental collaboration. In sum, accommodating oversight plus 
2011 CPA amendments that devolved more authority to local government   are 
clearly accomplishing prime CPA goals to strengthen local governments’ role and 
power vis-a-vis the state, grant localities more implementation flexibility, and 
expedite review and adoption of proposed plan amendments.   
But what about the CPA’s other major goal, protecting important state 
resources and facilities against adverse impacts? To be clear, I believe this 
focused state role is appropriate and provides the policy driver, foundation and the 
core justification for state compliance oversight. However, effective oversight is 
hampered and diluted by key CPA provisions. I will address two of these 
provisions.  
First, the CPA’s fundamental terms, important state resources and 
facilities are not statutorily defined and DEO is not authorized to define or refine 
these expansive terms by rule. Instead, for every proposed local plan amendment, 
up to ten state and regional government agencies may review the amendment and 
in the context of their statutory jurisdiction may determine what is an important 
state resource and facility and whether the amendment would adversely impact 
them.29   This entirely subjective, ad hoc identification and assessment policy 
favors no one. Plan amendment applicants, local governments, and interested 
citizens are all left to divine the situational preferences of the many reviewers; 
there are no reliable rules for engagement.30   Regulatory unpredictability is 
exacerbated by the reality that review agency policy preferences and interest in 
the program can be expected to change materially as state officers, governing 
body members and agency personnel cycle in and out of government. Lacking 
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established substantive benchmarks, state executive officers and the Legislature 
cannot appraise results and determine if the CPA’s seminal policies are being 
achieved, and the courts, when asked to do so, cannot determine if state action 
comports with legislative intent. Further, this open ended identification process is 
legally fraught and vulnerable to constitutional and administrative law 
challenges.31  
RESOLUTION  
The state requires local government to provide “meaningful, predictable 
planning standards for use and development of land.” 32 It should apply this same 
standard to its central oversight responsibility and amend the CPA accordingly. 
Specifically, the Legislature should define the key terms and direct DEO to refine 
the statutory definition and develop a rule that will particularly identify important 
state resources and facilities.  
The rule need not be exhaustive. A premium should be placed on 
identifying resources and facilities that have compelling statewide importance. A 
first step is to review state and regional review agency comments on prior 
proposed amendments. This should be followed by  an assessment of the scope 
and effectiveness of current federal, state and regional planning,  regulatory 
permitting, funding and land purchase programs that  could help identify   
possible gaps the CPA land use focus can fill or a state interest it can complement 
and promote.33  For example, resources could include certain environmentally rich 
and vulnerable areas that  are presently regulated by permits  or subject to general 
CPA directives  but would benefit from greater state oversight of local plan land 
use decisions.  A priority should be coastal and riverine areas that are or are 
reasonably expected to be impacted by sea level rise. 34   Another guidepost could 
recognize state investments in resources and facilities, such as the state’s 
significant financial contributions to cleaning Lake Okeechobee and restoring the 
Everglades, 35 and the effective functioning of facilities, such as major state 
funded highways and interchanges.   
 The rule should be adopted by the Governor and the elected state cabinet 
and be subject to legislative review and approval at the next legislative session 
following rule adoption.36     It’s time to do this. DEO has administered the CPA 
since 2011. It has processed thousands of proposed local plan amendments. This 
experience can provide a solid foundation for guidance that would direct, focus 
and circumscribe the state’s oversight role and provide a measure of consistent 
implementation and regulatory   certainty for all participants in the plan review 
process.     
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Next, recall the state may find a proposed plan amendment not in 
compliance with statutory standards. What happens if a local government disputes 
a state compliance finding? If the challenge goes to hearing, the state carries a 
heavy burden. To prevail, it must show by clear and convincing evidence that its 
determination is correct.37 Clear and convincing means a finding can be made 
with “a firm belief or conviction without hesitation about the matter in issue. “ 38 
This is a much higher bar than the competent substantial evidence standard that 
applies in Florida to almost all other administrative proceedings.39 
Why such a high bar for the state, especially in situations that call for a 
subjective policy judgment without the benefit of definitive substantive 
guidelines? Clear and convincing is not an appropriate standard in this context. 
Moreover, it is a major disincentive for the state to perform its compliance 
oversight role. The playing field should be evened; competent substantial 
evidence is the right test when governments cannot agree and the CPA should be 
amended accordingly. 
CODA 
Prior sustained executive branch and legislative efforts to reduce state 
oversight and grant local governments more flexibility and discretion to manage 
their growth culminated with passage of the CPA. The 2011 act is directionally 
correct; the GMA was overdue for revision and a refocus of the state’s oversight 
role on important state planning interests. However, the failure to define the core 
CPA terms that form the basis for state review plus a very difficult standard for 
state enforcement of its compliance decisions have significantly weakened the 
state’s ability to perform its primary substantive role in the planning program,  
oversight.40   
If the state desires to retain an oversight role it should be meaningful and 
must clearly identify the important state interests that justify state involvement in 
local planning and development regulation decisions. If not, the CPA compliance 
effort will continue to be viewed by many  as a box checking exercise that simply 
delays the effective date of locally approved plan amendments. This is a wasteful 
use of public and private resources. Moreover,   weak state engagement and 
oversight will invite new efforts by growth management opponents to undermine 
the remaining salient provisions of the act and to question the overall relevance of 
a state oversight role.41  
To paraphrase the ELMS II report, the state must reengage. State 
leadership is necessary for Florida to address the many planning issues of state 
importance that relentless growth continues to impose on already stressed 
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facilities and natural resources, including current and future deleterious effects of 
sea level rise on our peninsular state. As part of this effort, the CPA should be 
revised to produce clear guidelines to enable consistent administration by 
government, provide performance direction for citizens, and establish standards to 
assess program achievement for all parties, the Legislature and the courts.  
Florida’s Odyssean state planning program provides a several decades 
case study of an almost continuous intergovernmental battle for power to regulate 
land development. It merits consideration by any state seeking to sustain or join 
“the quiet revolution in land use controls. “ The program has experienced 
revolution, evolution and devolution;   it’s time for resolution that will provide a 
stable, sustainable program. The odyssey continues.  
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1. A comprehensive history of Florida’s planning and growth management 
programs   is Richard G. Rubino & Earl M. Starnes, Lessons Learned? The 
History of Planning in Florida (2008).  
2. 67 counties, 413 cities and certain special districts are subject to the 
requirements of the state planning act. 
3. The significance of regulatory predictability to enhance economic 
development opportunity for the state and localities is highlighted in The Florida 
Council of 100, Project Sunrise: an economic competitiveness strategy for the 
State of Florida, 67 (2018).  
4. The Florida Department of Economic Opportunity Division of Community 
Planning has compiled a history of all major community planning legislation and 
amendments from 1986—2018, www.floridajobs.org/docs/community-
development/comp-plan/stat. 
5. In a case that invalidated the statutory standards for designating areas of 
critical state concern, Florida’s First District Court of Appeal noted: “the primacy 
of local government jurisdiction in land development regulation” which reflects 
“historical preference” and is “a corollary of the people’s right to access 
government. “ Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 352 So.2nd 1052, 1053 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1977), aff’d Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2nd 913 (1978). 
6. Fred Bosselman & David Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control, 
1971. 
7. Laws of Florida, ch. 72-317, sec. 6. 
8. Laws of Florida ch. 72-317, sec. 5. 
9. Laws of Florida ch. 75-257. 
10. State of Florida, Final Report of the Second Environmental Land 
Management Study Committee, 1984. 
11. Robert M. Rhodes & Robert C. Apgar, “Charting Florida’s Course: the 1984 
State and Regional Planning Act,” 12 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 583 (1984). Florida’s 
checkered history developing state and regional plans to manage its growth and 
natural resources is addressed extensively in Rubino and Starnes, supra note 1. 
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12. Laws of Florida, ch. 85-55. For  documentation of the legislative history and 
major provisions of the GMA, see Thomas G. Pelham, William L. Hyde, and 
Robert P. Banks, “Managing Florida’s Growth Toward an Integrated State, 
Regional and Local Comprehensive Planning Process, “ 13 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
515 (1985). 
13. Jerry Weitz, Sprawl Busting, American Planning Association Planners Press, 
1999. 
14. Id., 328-329. 
15. State of Florida, Report of the Third Environmental Land Management Study 
Committee, 1992. For a summary of the Committee’s work, David Powell, 
Managing Florida’s Growth: The Next Generation,” Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 229 
(1993). The ELMS III recommendations were included in Laws of Florida, ch. 
93-206. 
16. Laws of Florida, ch. 2007-204, sec. 13. 
17. Laws of Florida, ch. 2009-96, sec. 9. 
18. Id., sec. 4 (transportation concurrency) and sections 2 and 12 (dense urban 
land areas).   
19. Laws of Florida, ch. 2011-139. 
20. Laws of Florida, ch. 2011-142, sec. 13. 
21. See  Linda Loomis Shelley & Karen Brodeen, Home Rule Redux: The 
Community Planning Act of 2011, 85 Fla. B.J. 49 (July/August 2011). A recurring 
theme of advocates for the bill that became the CPA was “let local government be 
local government”   which  reflects  the Florida First District Court of Appeal ‘s 
observation  in  Askew v. Cross Key Waterways concerning “the primacy of local 
government jurisdiction in land development regulation. “ supra, note 5.    
22. See Tom Pelham, Florida’s Retreat From Planning and Growth 
Management, American Planning Association, 9 Practicing Planner No.4; Nancy 
Stroud, A History and New Turns in Florida’s Growth Management Program, 45 
J. Marshall L. Rev. 397 (2012). See also Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Thomas 
E. Roberts, Patricia E. Salkin and Ryan Max Rowberry, Land Use Planning and 
Development Regulation Law 381, (4th ed. 2018), in which the authors comment 
that the 2011 CPA “virtually gutted the Florida growth management system. “   
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23. My focus on the state’s oversight role does not diminish the significance and 
effect of additional, consequential CPA amendments that loosened or repealed 
GMA provisions. Per the 2011 Act, transportation, parks and recreation and 
school concurrency are no longer mandates but remain local options. The 
frequency restriction on local plan amendments was repealed. Also repealed were 
policies that required plan amendments to be financially feasible and based on 
demonstrated need. Anti-sprawl provisions were made less stringent and third 
party challenges to plan amendments were made more difficult to win by 
subjecting the challenges to a fairly debatable test. The remaining DRI program 
was terminated and DRI scale projects were required to undergo requisite CPA 
review only if the proposed project is inconsistent with an adopted local plan.  
24. DEO has primary responsibility to review potential impacts to affordable 
housing, coastal high hazard areas and military installations. . 
25. Data gleaned from DEO’s website, www.floridajobs.org/docs/community-
development/communityplanning   and data provided the author by DEO. 
Interpretation of the data is solely the author’s.    
26. The CPA repealed state rule 9J-5, F.A.C., which provided minimum 
standards for state review of local amendments for compliance with state 
standards. Some of the former rule’s planning provisions are included in various 
parts of the CPA. The 2011 Act also provided that the legislatively adopted state 
comprehensive plan, Fla. Stat. ch. 187, will no longer be considered a factor in 
compliance review. See the definition of “in compliance” which no longer 
includes consistency with the state comprehensive plan. Fla. Stat. sec. 
3184(1)(b)(2019).  
27. Supra, note 25. 
28. Id. 
29. Fla. Stat. sec. 163.3184(1)(c) (2019), defining “reviewing agencies.”  
30. In an effort to infuse a measure of predictability into the local government 
land use decision process, Laws of Florida, ch. 2019-165, sec. 2, codified at Fla. 
Stat. sec. 125.022 (counties) and sec. 8, codified at Fla. Stat. sec. 166.033 (cities) 
provide    time frames for local government action on applications for 
development  orders and permits .   
31. Robert M. Rhodes, “The 2011 Community Planning Act: Certain Change, 
Uncertain Reform. “ 34 ELULS Reporter 1, 18, June 2013. 
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32. Fla. Stat. sec. 163.3177(1)(g)(10)(2019). 
33. Land use approvals and regulatory permitting often are conflated and lumped 
together as entitlements. Generally, land use approval will precede regulatory 
permitting. The initial, salient decision whether land may be used for particular 
uses will consider the principles and provisions of a local plan and in some 
instances consistency with the plan. Once approval to use the land is obtained, 
regulatory permitting insures project impacts are satisfactorily addressed and site 
integrity maintained.  
34. The CPA generally directs localities to plan for sea level rise and specifically 
authorizes but does not require localities to designate adaptation action areas for 
coastal areas that experience flooding and are vulnerable to sea level rise impacts. 
Fla. Stat. secs. 163.3164(1), 163.3177(6)(g)10, and 163.3178 (2019). However, 
DEO currently lacks authority to adopt substantive standards to assess local 
performance and compliance with state law.  
35. Governor Ron DeSantis’ Executive Order 19-12 directs state and regional 
agencies to give these actions priority. 
36. For context, the first DRI standards were approved by the Legislature and 
later amendments subject to legislative approval. Fla. Stat. sec. 380.10(2). (1977). 
Additionally, the effectiveness of the state rule establishing minimum criteria for 
review of local plans and amendments, Fla. Admin. Code Rule 9J-5, was 
conditioned on legislative review, rejection, modification or no action. In Askew 
v Cross Key Waterways,   372 So. 2nd 913, 925 (1978),  the Florida Supreme 
Court commented favorably on legislative approval of the DRI administrative 
standards prior to their effectiveness in contrast to the statutory standards 
applicable to areas of critical state concern, which the court invalidated. The 
legislature subsequently required an administrative rule designating an area of 
critical state concern to be submitted to the Legislature which may reject, modify 
or take no action on the rule. Fla. Stat. sec. 380.05(1)(c)(2019). 
37. Fla. Stat. sec. 163.3184(5)(c)(2019). 
38. Florida Supreme Court, Florida Standard Jury Instructions, sec. 411.3. 
39. Regarding application of the competent substantial evidence standard in state 
administrative proceedings, see Fla. Stat. sec. 120.57 (1)(l) and in regard to 
appeals of final state agency action, Fla. Stat. sec. 120.68(7)(b)(2019). For 
application of the standard in local land use  proceedings, see 
https://floridaldrs/2011/07/08 and generally  Gary K. Hunter and Douglas M. 
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Smith, “ABCs of Local Land Use and Zoning Decisions, “ 84 Fla. B.J. 20, Jan. 
2010.  
40. Although the state’s role has been diminished, major parts of the state 
planning program remain. Local plans and amendments must be proposed, 
considered, reviewed and may be challenged pursuant to statutory process. 
Citizens are offered liberal opportunities and public notice to participate in local 
government decisions. Development approvals and required land development 
regulations must be consistent with an adopted local plan; the plan is still the 
primary planning document and enjoys legal status. The state and a broad range of 
affected citizens may challenge local action to adopt plans and amendments for 
non-compliance with state standards. Local development approvals may be 
challenged judicially as inconsistent with an adopted local plan. And although no 
longer mandated, localities may continue to apply adequate public facility, 
concurrency, policies to mitigated transportation, parks and recreation and school 
impacts.  
41. For example, Laws of Florida, ch. 2019-165, sec. 7, codified at Fla. Stat. sec. 
163.3215(8)(c)(2019), provides a prevailing party in a judicial challenge to a 
development approval as inconsistent with a local plan is entitled to attorney fees 
and costs. This act will likely discourage frivolous and ill-intentioned citizen 
suits, but also will likely significantly dilute the effectiveness of this singular 
citizen enforcement remedy. 1000 Friends of Florida, a leading smart growth 
advocacy organization, strongly opposed this legislation and observed it will 
sound “the death knell” for enforcement of the CPA. 
www.1000friendsofflorida.org, 2019 Legislative Wrap Up: “HB 7103 Signed into 
Law.” 1000 Friends of Florida has filed suit to invalidate the mandatory 
prevailing party attorney fees and costs provision. 1000 Friends of Florida v. State 
of Florida, 2019-CA002215 (Fl. 2nd Cir.). 
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